Martinez and Olsen: A tale of two managers

Tactically, they’re worlds apart. But two managers on either side of the Atlantic share something deeper: a dressing room that runs on pure defiance and an unrelenting quest to rewrite the script.

With Roberto Martinez at the helm, English Premier League side Everton F.C. employ a fluid style with an emphasis on crisp passing and composure in possession.  Across the pond, Ben Olsen’s DC United of Major League Soccer rely on gritty defensive effort and direct attacks to grind out results.  An English football club founded by a Methodist Sunday school in 1878, an American soccer team conceived in a board room in 1995, with managers who differ in their fundamental approach to the game… the similarities may seem tenuous.  But, Everton F.C. and DC United share similar roles within their respective situations, and more importantly their managers share a deep insistence upon rejecting the narratives that many see as absolute in the modern game.

The Decline of Champions

“Plucky little Everton”… “Punching above there weight”… the English press is never hesitant to lavish Everton with backhanded praise.   Founding members of the first professional football league in England, Everton have spent more time in the top flight of English football than any other club and have won 9 league titles and 15 major trophies overall.  Everton have exemplified the motto Nil Satis Nisi Optimum – “Nothing is enough but the best” – across most of the club’s storied history, but are currently experiencing a 20 year trophy drought brought on by the financial realities of modern football.  The beautiful game is now a multi-billion dollar industry, and with an aging stadium and a smaller global brand than their local rivals, Everton do not have the revenue streams and financial might to register as a club of any stature in the modern game.

Where Everton’s fall from glory took place as a slow trickle, DC United have experienced similar highs and lows in the club’s short lifespan of 20 years.  They were the inaugural Major League Soccer cup champions in 1996, and have won a total of 4 league championships and a nice assortment of other top honors.  United’s last league championship however was back in 2004, and as the league has expanded to include more teams, the team has struggled to remain relevant.

The importance of financial strength in achieving success is palpable in English football, but it exists by design in the US brand of the game.  MLS maintains a strict salary cap, but allows clubs to spend beyond the cap for a limited amount of “designated players.”  Wealthier owners (or those more concerned with on the pitch success) can spend an unlimited amount on designated player salaries, which often results in clubs like DC United with shrewd ownership groups getting left behind.  DC United’s stadium woes – the horribly aging and completely commercially non-viable RFK stadium  – dwarf those of Everton, as it’s clear that the club’s venture capitalist owners are not interested in investing beyond the bare minimum until a new stadium is built.

Tactical Foils

Roberto Martinez took over for 10-year Everton manager David Moyes, who was rewarded for consistently leading Everton to top half finishes on a shoe-string budget with a move to Manchester United.  Moyes’ sides were known for their defensive organization and work ethic.  In 2004, Moyes’ Everton achieved their highest Premier League finish and earned a chance to qualify for the holy grail of European football – The Champions League – in large part by grinding out 1-0 victories through disciplined defensive performances.

When Martinez took over, he immediately set to work changing the mindset of the players on the pitch.  Martinez put in place an expansive style of play with a heavy emphasis on rhythmic passing, a style that relied on patient buildup and intelligent movement to unlock defensively minded teams.  In training drills, Martinez has the starting goalkeeper first go through passing exercises with the outfield players before joining the other goalkeepers, because he insists that every player be comfortable playing with the ball at his feet. Where a Moyes team would have defenders boot the ball up to their attackers, Martinez has his back four pass the ball out from the back.

Ben Olsen’s approach to the game on the other hand is much more similar to Martinez’s predecessor.  Endearingly referred to as “BennyBall”, Olsen requires his striker to be a first defender.  At times it seems he’ll prioritize a striker who can win the long balls hoofed up by defenders over one who actually scores goals.  Olsen’s DC relies on gritty and aggressive defenders, not unlike Olsen’s style as a player for the black and red.

Both managers have had up and down seasons in their tenures.  When Everton bled goals last season, the team faced criticism for overplaying and attempting to play “beautiful” style that exceeded the ability of the players.  Olsen has faced the opposite criticism this year, as many a tweet bemoaned his conservative and pragmatic approach even as DC sat in first place earlier this season.

Restoration through Defiance

Facing the same challenge to achieve success in the face of financial limitations, both managers rely on different strategies.  But there’s a deeper connection at work here, as both managers parlay these pragmatic limitations into a driving force to inspire the best from their teams.

When Martinez was first confirmed as Everton manager, he told Everton Chairman Bill Kenwright “I will get you into the Champions League.”  Rather than fixate on the club’s lack of financial clout, he emphasized it’s illustrious history, and had pictures of legendary Everton players hung around the club’s training facilities to reinforce that standard of achievement amongst the squad.

This defiant insistence upon greatness didn’t always translate to results on the pitch, but it was perfectly captured in this summer’s transfer window.

Russian-oligarch-owned defending Premier League Champions Chelsea F.C. submitted a bid for John Stones, a highly promising 21 year old central defender who took over as a starter for Everton last season.  The initial bid was promptly turned down, triggering a media maelstrom as ex-players and pundits all felt the need to weigh in.

One of the theguardian’s many attempts to convince Stones to quit Everton

Like most mid-table sides, for the past decade Everton have resigned themselves to losing their top players whenever a rich club came calling.  In the modern game, such is the natural order of things, so much so that Everton drew criticism for insisting Stones, a player on a four-year contract, is better off staying with his current club.  To many pundits, choosing to force a transfer to a Champions League club, rather than staying put and working to get your current club there, is a sign of ambition.

Eventually the media campaign did its job, and young John Stones submitted a formal request for a transfer.  It looked certain that Stones would leave, but the next day Stones was in the starting lineup against his former club Barnsley in the League Cup.  In his post match comments, Martinez explained that Stones’ transfer request will be rejected the next day, stating “sometimes can’t buy everything.”

In the first game after the window closed, Everton and Chelsea met at Goodison Park, with Stones in the starting lineup.  The entire Everton team played lights out, taking the game to Chelsea like they were any other team.  It was fitting that Steven Naismith, a close friend of Stones and the first Everton player to tell the media that Stones should stay put scored a perfect hat-trick off the bench to give Everton a 3-1 victory.

Young John Stones celebrates the first goal against Chelsea with hat-trick hero Steven Naismith

The post-match words of Brendan Galloway, another promising young defender who assisted the opening goal, perfectly sum up the sense of confidence and defiance of the supposed order of things:

“We know what we can do and we don’t fear anyone, especially when they come to Goodison,” declared Galloway.

They may have been the champions but we didn’t give them that respect.

“We shouldn’t give anyone any respect, especially in games at Goodison.

“We always know what we are capable of, we do it everyday in training, and we’ve started the season well.

As the Goodison faithful sang “Money can’t buy you Stones”, Everton translated their defiant attitude into an emphatic win.  I doubt Everton will reach that level again all season, but if only for a game they invoked a spirit more mighty than the rhinestone glitz of the modern game.

While Martinez showed reverence for Everton’s historic glory, at DC United Ben Olsen lived it.  As a player he won two of the clubs four MLS cups, and was named MVP in the 1999 cup final.  His tenacity on the pitch earned him folk-hero status, and the Cult of Olsen has only grown since he took over as a manager.  Win or lose, after every game the supporters bellow his name, and Olsen dutifully walks over to return their reverence with applause – a ritual that now feels as much a part of club tradition as half-time drum-circles and beer-shower goal celebrations.

Olsen lifts the cup after scoring the winner in the 1999 MLS cup final

Since Olsen’s player days and in the post-Beckham era, DC United have waned in prominence as the fledgling league bends over backwards to accommodate teams who spend big on marquee players.

So it was when DC met the rival NY Red Bulls in the 2012 MLS cup playoffs.  As the (at the time) sole team in the NYC media market, and lead by one of the all-time European greats Thierry Henry, the Red Bulls often appeared to be the league darlings. DC United, as the higher seed, were supposed to host the second leg of their two-match playoff, this would allow the higher seeded team to host overtime if they tie on aggregate.  After hurricane sandy hit, N.Y. were unable to host the first leg.  Rather than delay the playoff, D.C. were simply reassigned to play the first leg at home instead and lost their home field advantage in the process.

After the first leg in DC ended in a draw, the situation worsened.  Hundred’s of the DC faithful traveled up to New Jersey for the crucial away leg as a snow storm struck.  With the traveling fans bouncing and the team ready, DC were so insistent upon playing the game that Ben Olsen picked up a shovel to help the ground crew clear the field, but it was to no avail.  The league postponed the game to the following day, meaning most of the fans who made the trip would leave without seeing a ball kicked.

The following night’s match was a cagey affair that boiled over when United’s star goalkeeper conceded a penalty and was shown a red card for bringing down Red Bull striker Kenny Cooper in the box.  When the club seemed at it’s lowest, backup keeper Joe Willis came up with an all-important save to keep the score level, and shortly thereafter rookie Nick DeLeon scored the match-winner.  And where else would DeLeon go, with visible tears in his eyes, but to right in front of the traveling supporters to celebrate.

Chris Pontius and Nick DeLeon celebrate the play-off winner in New Jersey

It may not have been a fair attitude, but after the series of unfortunate events, the narrative was set.  The league, the weather, fate, whatever – it was all out to get us but we weren’t going to take.  Maybe it was reasonable to shift the schedule around, and Hamid’s dismissal was almost certainly warranted, but none of that mattered at the time.  In 15 seconds, Hamid’s post-match outburst perfectly captures the pathos surrounding the club:

“They can’t hold us back.”

DC have faced some ups and downs since, but the attitude remains the same even this season.  Ahead of our first match against expansion team New York City F.C., United striker Chris Rolfe commented on NYC’s star-power driven approach to development :

“It’s disappointing when you have owners that are willing to forego a culture and try to buy the fanciest commodities and try to make a team out of it. I don’t respect that”

In a league where money reigns supreme and buying aging stars to put asses in seats is the fastest way to “most favored club” status, DC players and fans alike are begrudgingly proud to do things differently.

Reality Catches Up

This isn’t a fairy tale, and it’s not a coming-of-age tale about a rag-tag gang of pre-teen misfits.

That game against NYC FC? DC United lost, and we’ve lost 4 of our next 5 games since.

Things look decidedly rosier for Everton, who currently sit 5th in the Premier League despite a string difficult early fixtures. But the average Everton supporter is properly conditioned to expect the worst, even when things are going well we can’t shake the feeling that the regression to the mean is coming.

For the time being, Everton continue to surpass the summer’s low expectations, while United have thrown away the chance to win the Supporters Shield (team with best regular season record) and are set to barely back into the playoffs.

Yet despite their divergent recent paths, both clubs face similar precipices.  Tonight, DC United play their second match against NYCFC, and will clinch a playoff berth with a win.  Fresh off a new contract, Chris Rolfe has a chance to back up his strong words to get DC’s season back on track, and show NYC superstars David Villa, Andrea Pirlo, and Frank Lampard that there’s more to this league than fat paychecks and cringey photo shoots.  On Sunday, Everton face local their local rivals in the merseyside derby, a fixture so nerve-wracking I won’t even entertain the scenario of a win until after the final whistle, but one that I will say could be season defining.

Two managers, both facing imminent tests.  Over the last year, both Martinez and Olsen have been forced to bear their vulnerabilities to the world in their respective periodic struggles.  Now as before, each looks to double down on his own brand of philosophical intransigence, and infuse it with a healthy dose of defiant passion to will his club against the prevailing winds of modern football.

Again, this isn’t a fairy-tale, and years of supporting both clubs have taught me not to expect much. I’m fully prepared for reality to catch up, for la résistance to breakdown without fanfare, and for both clubs to resume their mid-table roles in the status quo order of football.   But looking inward, I don’t think the manic masochistic whirlwind of supporting either team has ever really been about the result.  I’m in it for the fight, and no matter how things turn out I’ll know we tried.


In defense of Jill Ellis (and Abby Wambach)

On Monday night, the U.S. Women’s National Soccer Team registered it’s 3rd successive clean sheet en route to defeating Colombia 2-0 in the first knock-out round of the 2015 Women’s World Cup.  Despite the relatively comfortable victory against a Colombian side who were reduced to 10 players following a red card shortly after the half-time restart, manager Jill Ellis has come under intense criticism for a performance that many an arm-chair analyst and beat-blogger  have deemed “not convincing”.  Former USWNT star Michelle Akers may have delivered the most scathing criticism:

“If she [Ellis] is pleased with the way we played tonight then what the hell is she doing coaching our U.S. team.”

Ouch.  I’ve heard various points of criticism from all around, among them that our 4-4-2 formation is outdated and stale, that we are over-reliant on playing long-balls up to our forwards, that we lack creativity in attacking, and that Ellis needs to drop aging star Abby Wambach.  I will readily concede that the team hasn’t exactly been dominant thus far in the tournament, but to me the negativity seems horribly misplaced.

Playing Style

The supposed “lack-of-diversity” in our attacking approach is as good a place to start as any.  I keep hearing that our attack is one-dimensional, that all we do boot long balls up to our forwards – a hit-and-hope mentality.

First of all, when you have players like break-out star Julie Johnston who can drop the ball right on a player’s forehead from across the field, hoofing it forward isn’t the worst thing in the world:

Second, the way Colombia set up encouraged us to play it long.  When our defenders were in possession of the ball, Colombian players surrounded the center circle to clog up midfield.  This didn’t stop us from trying to play it out from the back anyways, we actually tried it quite often. Usually something like this happened:

or this


Notice the number of yellow shirts in that area of the pitch.  A lot of our attempts to pass it out from the back worked out better than these two examples, they often lead to throw-ins that gave us a good platform to build an attack.  But the last two gifs demonstrate the danger in our defenders losing possession there.  Plus, Colombia’s approach left holes between their midfield and back 4, so why wouldn’t we send some balls over-the-top to take advantage of it?

Third, we actually showed a ton of diversity in our approach and creativity once we had the ball in the final third.  Yes, I know more than a few diagonal balls were floated toward Morgan/Wambach without great effect, but that was far from our only threat. We worked the ball cleverly to set up Heath’s early shot that nearly put us ahead:


Here we tried to pass it through their defense in the final third, a failed effort but definitely the right intent:

The team showed ingenuity and precision to get players in behind the defense down the right flank:

and the left:

Check out the patient build-up, passing, and movement that takes place here before Meghan Klingenberg receives the ball on the overlap down the left:

and here’s Klingenberg’s subsequent shot that nearly put the US ahead:

By the way, those attacking examples were all from the first half, and no I didn’t gif every single one, nor did I gif any of the numerous corners we earned. The team took a very balanced approach to attacking, varied its cadence to catch Colombia out, and showed good coordination punctuated by moments of individual skill.

Do I believe that Jill Ellis’s plan was perfect? No, and truthfully I would have done a lot of things differently.  Maybe the 4-4-2 formation is a little bit stale, and maybe it is risky to start two attack-minded players in Carli Lloyd and Lauren Holiday in central midfield.  But would replacing one of them with a defense-minded sitting midfielder, or even adding one in as a 3rd central midfielder, really have made a difference against Colombia’s effectively 6-player midfield?

The team set out very differently from what I would have pictured.  After the first game against Australia I had started brainstorming with friends about how we could change personnel to shore up midfield.  But against Colombia, the team created numerous chances without leaving itself exposed in the back, and these efforts were eventually rewarded with goals.

Abby Wambach

Prior to the 2014 World Cup, USMNT manager Jurgen Klinsmann came under fire for leaving out the Talismanic Landon Donovan from the squad.  He compared the situation to Kobe Bryant’s contract:

“This always happens in America. Kobe Bryant, for example — why does he get a two-year contract extension for $50 million? Because of what he is going to do in the next two years for the Lakers? Of course not. Of course not. He gets it because of what he has done before. It makes no sense.”

Jill Ellis finds herself the subject of criticism for the opposite reason – her reluctance to drop underperforming veteran Abby Wambach.

Has Wambach lived up to her own standards?  Absolutely not, and I’m sure she’d be the first to admit as much.  But to focus only on her shortcomings is to ignore her crucial contributions to the team.

Technique wise, she’s still got it.  This half-volley effort was only denied by goalkeeping heroics:

Now, check out Rapinoe’s ball to play in Alex Morgan and draw the first penalty / red card:

It’s a bit hard to make out, but when Wambach drops deep to support Rapinoe, Colombia’s #14 follows her, creating a huge pocket of space for Morgan to burst into and…well… you know the rest.

Now have a look at Morgan’s goal:


Wambach wins the initial header to keep the play alive. Then, as Morgan receives the ball, #14 on Colombia, who is initially goal-side of Johnston, glances toward Wambach, and her hesitation allows Johnston to gain a half-step on her.  Granted, Morgan took the selfish route and scored by herself, but she also had the easy option to play in Johnston, thanks to the space that Wambach helped create for her.  Even when Wambach is underperforming, she is always a goal threat.

I don’t think Wambach should get an indefinite pass.  I agreed with Klinsmann’s decision to drop Donovan.  But unlike Wambach, Donovan was never in the conversation of being the best striker in the world.  Sure, Wambach’s penalty miss was poor, but the fact that she chose not to take the second penalty – sacrificing her easy chance to tie Brazilian legend Marta’s record – shows her commitment to the cause.  I want to see Abby start knocking them in as much as anyone, but her role in the team goes well beyond poaching headers.  I don’t know if I would drop Wambach on current form, but I can completely understand why Ellis chooses not to.

“Win Convincingly”

So far, the US Women’s national team hasn’t conceded a goal since the 27th minute against Australia – over 333 minutes without conceding.  The team is consistently creating chances, and we haven’t really looked like losing… at all… this tournament.  Yet I keep hearing people saying that the way we’re winning isn’t “convincing”, implying that we’ll easily lose to a better team.  I think Abby Wambach’s words in the team huddle just before the second half against Colombia respond to this criticism as well as anything I could write:

“We all know we have another level right? It’s just a matter of time before we get that goal, stay patient!

Not a rallying cry to give 110% and push for the win, just a calm but emphatic reminder to stick the plan.  With or without the red card, Colombia were never going to be able to keep up the energetic high press for another 45 minutes, and the U.S. rightly trusted that if they continued to go about their business, quality would win out in the end.

En route to winning the 2014 men’s World Cup, Germany needed extra time to beat Algeria in the first knock-out round, and only avoided a penalty shootout by minutes.  They then went on to beat Brazil 7-1 in the semi-finals.  Runners-up Argentina also needed 118 minutes to find a breakthrough against Switzerland, and only found it through a moment of Messi-anic magnificence.

I’ll fully accept the ridicule coming my way if we get upset by China or trounced by Germany/France, but I really don’t see it.  At the highest level, you don’t set out to make statements with your performances.  That sort of conversation keeps the pundits in business, but it’s not the point.  Team USA is not in Canada right now to “convince” us of anything, they’re there to lift a trophy.  Stay. Patient.


(bonus gif of Klingenberg’s through-ball to Rapinoe with the outside of her foot to set up the second penalty… because damn it’s thing of beauty)



MLS’s Beautiful Game Theory

2014 was a huge year for US Soccer. We managed to escape the World Cup group-of-death at the expense of Portugal, with a squad of both veterans and bright young stars, a former World Cup winner in Jurgen Klinsmann at the helm, and without the talismanic if not a bit egomaniacal Landon Donovan anywhere near the USMNT setup.  The MLS playoffs featured some really high quality play, including, I’ll begrudgingly admit, that which ended the playoff run of my beloved DC United.

Then, on the last day of 2014, we learned the truth about Frank Lampard.

Long story short,the supposed marquee signing of a new MLS team, New York City FC turned out to actually be under contract by English Club Manchester City FC, owned by the same parent company. MLS, a league desperate to be taken seriously on the international stage, was treated as a plaything for a powerful European team.

Lampard was touted as the first signing of New York City Football Club, the new MLS that will begin playing in 2015.  NYCFC is owned by the same corporation as Premier League side Manchester City, and us fans were lead to believe that the 35 year old English veteran Lampard was loaned back to Manchester City by NYCFC for the start of the year. Well, a funny thing happened when Lampard started playing for City.  Beginning with a goal against the club Lampard had spent his entire career at, Chelsea FC, Lampard proved at his ripe old age that he still has plenty of ability and went on a run of scoring goals for fun.  Lampard proved to be an important player to City, so important that the Manchester club decided they would hang onto him for the remainder of the 2014-2015 season. We then learned that Lampard never really had a contract with the New York City expansion team, and was in fact signed to Manchester City on a permanent deal.  After NYCFC used Lampard’s image to promote the team and sell season tickets, it was revealed he was never their player at all.  Worse, since all MLS contracts are negotiated through the league and not the individual teams, MLS would likely have been aware of this situation, and may possibly have been content with an English Club treating their assets as a glorified farm system.


MLS commissioner Don Garber spoke on the issue on Sunday night in his typical uninformative fashion, claiming that NYCFC doesn’t operate as a farm team for Manchester City without providing any evidence to the contrary.

After this mess, US Soccer fans could use something to be positive about, and an empirical look at the state of the sport in the not-so-distant past gives us, in my opinion, plenty of reason to be positive.

In The Beautiful Game Theory, social scientist Ignacio Palacio-Huerta uses empirical data collected from soccer matches to discuss and test common social sciences and economic hypotheses.  One of his coolest insights relates to penalty shootouts, where he presents evidence showing that the best professional players in the world appear to use mixed-strategies in line with the “minimax theorem” when they decide where to kick the ball.

I’ll try to break it down in laymen’s terms: penalty shootouts work like what economists call a “zero-sum” game.  For each shot, either the shooter wins (by scoring) or the goalie wins (by stopping them from scoring).  Shooters usually have a strong side, where they can hit the ball with more power and accuracy, and a weaker side (the book discusses the possibility of shooting down the middle, but I’m not going to talk about it here for simplicity sake).

So say I’m a professional soccer player, and I’m right footed which means I can shoot better at the left side of the goal.  If I were to use a “pure strategy”, meaning I shoot at the left every time, the goalie would be able to guess which way I will shoot easily, and would therefore be able to save my shot pretty easily.  Instead, my optimal strategy would be to shoot left most of the time, but also shoot right pretty often, so that I play to my strengths without being predictable.  I also want each shot I take to be an “independent trial”, meaning I want to make the decision about where I shoot anew each time, without worrying about whether I shot to that side last time or not.

As a shooter, I want to pick a strategy where my probability of scoring is equal for both sides. An optimal strategy is one where I cannot improve on it by choosing to increase the frequency with which I shoot to one side. An optimal strategy – meaning the perfect breakdown of choosing left/right – is one where for the given strategy: p(R)=p(L) – the probability of scoring if I shoot left is the same as the probability of scoring if I shoot right. If this were not the case, if for instance, p(R)>p(L), this would not be an optimal mixed strategy, because it would make sense for me to shoot to the right more often.  This is called “equating payoffs.”

At least, that’s how economists would predict that a perfectly rational player would make this decision.  Economic models don’t always line up with the way living, breathing, human beings make these decisions in real life situations, but Palacios-Huerta used data from 9,017 penalty kicks taken from September 1995-June-2012 to test whether players actually act the way the perfectly rational hypothetical player would.  He found that the vast majority of players in the top leagues equated pay-offs, and that they passed the “runs test”, meaning they appeared to choose where to shoot independently each time.  In a rare victory for social scientists, theory matched up with real life behavior, because these top professionals chose optimal strategies when they stepped up to the spot.

More technical stuff

The study looked at whether the data could reject the null hypothesis that players would use a pure strategy. At the 95% confidence level, out of 40 players, they were able to reject the null hypothesis for only 2 players (interestingly, those 2 players were David Villa and Frank Lampard, the first two signings of New York City FC), meaning that the other 38 players chose strategies that were close enough to the theoretical predictions that, using the data, they could not conclude the other 38 players did not use pure strategies. I have some issues with the methodology, as Palacios-Huerta seems to treat the thing he’s trying to prove (that players use strategies in line with the minimax theorem) as his null hypothesis. The study also looked at the amount of “runs” that occurred for each player – where a player would shoot at the same spot multiple times in a row, and found that for almost all players, the amount of runs that occurred were consistent with the statistically likely outcome if players selected where to place their penalties independently.


What does this have to do with American soccer?  Well, researchers also did a similar test with 20 MLS players with data from the league.  Looking at the players in the top European Leagues, only 2 out of 40 players were shown not to use optimal mixed strategies when choosing where to shoot their penalty kicks (interestingly, one of these players was Lampard). With MLS, 10 out of 20 players,  half of the players that they looked at, used non-optimal strategies when they took penalties.  But that’s not even the worst of it, a 2009 survey asked MLS players where they like to place their PKs, and 44% of MLS players said that they would shoot the ball in the same spot EVERY TIME.  This is the equivalent of professional rock-paper-scissors players saying that their strategy is to “play scissors.”

The date of these studies isn’t specified, but they definitely date back to a bygone era in the history of MLS. This was before the arrival of former Premier League stars like Thierry Henry, Robbie Keane, Tim Cahill, and Obafemi Martins… before the return of Michael Bradley and Clint Dempsey to MLS… before players that graduated from MLS development programs like Perry Kitchen showed they can dominate experienced internationals like Rafa Marquez in midfield battle… before Deandre Yedlin shined against some of the best teams in the world and earned a dream move to Tottenham…before Jurgen Klinsmann instituted changes to the entire structure of youth soccer coaching in the US at all levels, similar to the reforms he pioneered years ago in Germany that may have been crucial to Die Mannschaft’s  2014 World Cup triumph.

Another study by Palacios-Huerta showed that players from the top leagues will pick optimal strategies even when playing a card game with the same payoffs as a penalty kick shootout (but with no direct resemblance to soccer), while players in lower leagues may not.  In other words, players in better leagues are better able to intuitively apply their understanding of the dynamics of penalty kicks, even in situations that look nothing like a penalty kick.

I would be willing to bet that if the preceding studies were conducted today, you’d find that players in MLS are much more competent at choosing where to place their penalty kicks, because the standard of play in the league, and consequently the “footballing brain” required to make it in MLS, has risen considerably.

The Lampard debacle has made it very difficult to take MLS seriously as a professional soccer league, but that shouldn’t overshadow the progress that the league has made.  The analysis of penalty kicks from the past shows that in some regards, the European elites were right to scoff at us.  In spite of setbacks like the Lampard situation and Garber’s tendency to kowtow to anyone with even a moderate amount of influence, things are getting better and its happening quickly.  The more prestigious leagues may be right to think of MLS as a joke for now, but I have a feeling that in a few years time when the gains of improved development structures have been realized, the European has-beens looking to MLS for a cushy retirement in a non-competitive league won’t find us so funny.


The Myth of Martinez

Just before the beginning of the 2014/2015 Premier League season, I wrote what was initially supposed to be a blog post, but turned into an obnoxiously long essay.  I had just read The Myth of Sisyphus by Albert Camus, and my essay relates Camus’ concept of “The Absurd Man” to Roberto Martinez, the new manager of English Premier League club Everton F.C., and his approach to the sport.

I tried to write it so a casual soccer fan will be able to understand it, and so someone with a cursory familiarity with philosophy can follow it, though it turned out denser than I expected.

Let me know what you think